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A PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE LAW OF
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES: INSIGHTS FROM
THE LITERATURE ON SELF-DISCLOSURE
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
The rules governing privileges such as attorney-client and
psychotherapist-patient are arguably the most important evidentiary
doctrines. Most evidentiary rules relate to the courts' institutional
concerns. For instance, the authentication and hearsay doctrines are
largely calculated to ensure the reliability of the evidence submitted
to the trier of fact.' By enhancing the trustworthiness of that
evidence, the rules increase the probability that the trier will make
accurate findings of fact. The focus of these rules is on the in-court
behavior of witnesses, attorneys, and triers.
Privilege rules stand in sharp contrast. These doctrines rest on
"'extrinsic policy.' 2 During the 1973 Congressional hearings on the
then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, former Supreme Court
Justice Arthur Goldberg remarked that privilege rules are "the
concern of the public at large." 3  During the Congressional
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
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1. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REv. 227,
229 n. 11 (1988) (noting that underlying many of the categorical negative rules
was the assumption that jurors in a less-sophisticated time were ill-equipped to
accurately assess the reliability of some evidence).
2. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, at v
(John T. McNaughton rev., 1961).
3. Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 143-44
(1973) (testimony of Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg).
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deliberations, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman observed that
"unlike most evidentiary rules, privileges protect interpersonal
relationships outside of the courtroom." 4 It is a matter of common
knowledge that in selecting cases for decision, the Supreme Court
tends to select cases that are most likely to have significant social
impact. In that light, it speaks volumes that since the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court has rendered more decisions
relating to privilege law than any other part of the Federal Rules.5
If privileges are the most important doctrinal area in Evidence,
the late Dean Wigmore is undeniably the most important
commentator on that doctrinal area. Although many of the volumes
of his classic treatise are now badly out of date, even today his
treatment of privileges exercises great authority.6  The original
version of the Federal Rules of Evidence drafted by the Advisory
Committee contained detailed privilege provisions, and the
accompanying Advisory Committee Notes were replete with
frequent citations to Wigmore's privilege volume.7  During the
Congressional hearings on the draft, numerous witnesses appealed to
Wigmore's work as authority.8 Of even more importance, the courts
often treat the volume as persuasive secondary authority.9 In one
decision, the Supreme Court declared that Dean Wigmore's
theorizing on the topic has long been viewed as the rationale for
privileges.' 0 In its two most recent privilege opinions, Jaffee v.
4. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 28 (1973).
5. See Note, Protecting Confidential Communications Between a
Psychotherapist and Patient: Jaffee v. Redmond, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 963,
963 n.1 (1997).
6. See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND
WIGMORE 171 (1985).
7. See, e.g., PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 235, 237,
240, 243-47, 249, 253, 255, 257 (3d ed. 2003).
8. See generally 1 EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE:
EvIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 4.2.1 (2002) (noting that at many points the draft
embodied Wigmorean views).
9. See 1 JOHN S. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 300 (5th ed.
1999) (acknowledging that "Wignore's views have been widely accepted by
the courts").
10. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (stating that the
central concern underlying the privilege is to "'encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests' (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
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Redmond" dealing with psychotherapist-patient in 1996 and Swidler
& Berlin v. United States12 dealing with attorney-client in 1998, the
Supreme Court invoked the authority of the treatise.
If Wigmore is the most important privilege theorist, perhaps his
most important tenet is that interpersonal privileges must be
"absolute" in character.' 3 In this context, "absolute" is a technical
term of art. 14  Wigmore realized that decision makers such as
legislatures and judges must employ a balancing test to determine
whether, as a matter of general policy, to confer a privilege on a
particular relationship such as attorney-client. 5 Furthermore, he
conceded both that a privilege holder should be permitted to waive
the privilege and that the privilege could be subject to exceptions
enunciated beforehand. 16
Yet Wigmore argued that if a privilege applied and there was no
recognized exception to its scope, the opposing litigant ought not be
allowed to overcome the privilege by a case-specific showing of
need for the privileged information.' 7 Wigmore contended that the
389 (1981)).
11. 518 U.S. 1,9(1996).
12. 524 U.S. 399, 406 (1998).
13. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay On Rethinking
the Foundation ofEvidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REv. 315, 319 (2003).
14. Id.
15. See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The
Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74
WASH. L. REv. 913, 998 (1999) (referring to Wigmore's fourth condition to
establish a privilege, i.e., where the injury to the relation caused by the
disclosure of communications must be greater than the benefit gained by the
correct disposal of litigation).
16. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption
Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U.
PITT. L. REv. 145, 147 (2004).
17. Id.; see, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d
1486, 1495 (9th Cir. 1989) (remanding case "with instructions to vacate the
part of the order compelling production" of privileged communications despite
the loss of information needed to establish plaintiff's case); United States v.
Grice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 428, 431 n.13 (D.S.C. 1998) (acknowledging the
principle that no matter how great prosecutorial need for privileged
information may be, the privilege still prevails); see also 1 PAUL R. RICE,
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.2, at 11 (2d ed.
1999) (noting that absent a waiver of protection, the privilege precludes the
disclosure of communications regardless of the need for the information).
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trial judge should be forbidden from employing a balancing test to
determine whether, in a given case, the need for the privileged
information outweighed the policies underlying the privilege.
18
According to Wigmore, ad hoc balancing was anathema. 19 That
view reflected Wigmore's fundamental behavioral assumption that
without the assurance of confidentiality that a formal evidentiary
privilege provided, laypersons such as potential patients would not
confer with or confide in consultants such as therapists. For its
part, the Supreme Court has not only indicated that it agrees with
Wigmore's behavioral assumption,21 but has signaled in no uncertain
terms that it shares Wignore's view that interpersonal privileges
must be absolute. In both Jaffee and Swidler & Berlin, the lower
courts took the position that the privilege was qualified and could be
defeated by a compelling demonstration of necessity.22 In both cases,
the Supreme Court characterized the privilege as absolute in a
Wigmorean sense.2 3 In Swidler & Berlin, the majority stated that
"uncertain privileges are disfavored. 24  The Court classified the
privilege as absolute in order to avoid injecting "substantial
uncertainty into the privilege's application." 25  In the Court's
wording, "[b]alancing ex post the importance of the information
against client interests.., introduces" intolerable "uncertainty.
' 26
At first blush, it appears puzzling that Wigmore advocated
absolute privileges. Like his predecessor, the great utilitarian
philosopher Jeremy Bentham, Wigmore subscribed to the truth
18. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 319-20.
19. See id.
20. Id. at317.
21. In Upjohn, the Court asserted that at the very time of their interaction,
the participants "must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 393 (1981). If the layperson, such as the potential client, cannot
confidently forecast whether in the future a privilege will cloak his or her
revelation, the person presumably will not consult or confide. The layperson
cannot make that prediction if, after the fact of the communication, a judge
may override the privilege based on a showing of need.
22. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1996); Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 524 U.S. 1, 402 (1998).
23. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18; Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408-09.
24. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402.
25. Id. at 409.
26. Id.
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theory of litigation. 27 He was sympathetic with Bentham's rationalist
premise that the primary objective in adjudication is rectitude of
decision.28 The first and foremost objective of the litigation system
must be to accurately ascertain the truth.29 How then could Wigmore
favor absolute privileges? He understood that in general, privileges
impeded the search for truth. Worse still, an absolute privilege could
be an insuperable barrier to the discovery of the truth.
In Wigmore's mind, though, it was easy to reconcile the truth
theory with his advocacy of absolute privileges. Wigmore advocated
the conferral of privileges on social relations only if the "element of
confidentiality" is "essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance
of the relation between the parties." 30 Confidentiality had to be so
essential to the relationship that absent the assurance that an absolute
privilege afforded, the layperson would not confer with or confide in
the potential consultant. As support for his position, Wigmore
quoted the sweeping language in an 18th century English decision to
the effect that without such an attorney-client privilege, "there would
be an entire stop to [legal] business; nobody would trust an attorney
with the state of his affairs." 31 In 1976, the Supreme Court explained
in Fisher v. United States32 that the attorney-client privilege is
designed to "protect[] only those disclosures-necessary to obtain
informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the
privilege." In Jaffee, Justice Stevens wrote:
[T]he likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the
denial of the [psychotherapist] privilege is modest. If the
privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between
psychotherapists and their patients would surely be
chilled .... Without a privilege, much of the desirable
27. See Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 150 (noting that Wigmore agreed
with Bentham's belief that the main objective in litigation is rectitude of
decision).
28. Id.; see TWINING, supra note 6, at 14-16.
29. See TWINING, supra note 6, at 14-16; BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991) (exploring the development
of the beyond a reasonable doubt doctrine).
30. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285, at 527-28.
31. 8 Id. § 2291, at 545-46 (quoting Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How.
St. Tr. 1139 (Ex. 1743)).
32. 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
Winter 20041
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evidence to which litigants such as [plaintiffs] seek
access-for example, admissions.., by a party-[would
be] unlikely to come into being. This unspoken "evidence"
[would] therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function
than if it had been spoken and privileged.33
In short, the absolute privilege is conceived as a necessary
incentive for the typical layperson contemplating a
communication with an attorney or therapist.34 The assumption
is that there is a causal relationship between the recognition of
such privileges and the occurrence of the desired behavior; but
for the existence of the privilege, the average person would
supposedly be unwilling to engage in the conduct of consulting
and confiding.
35
Positing this behavioral assumption allowed Wigmore to
reconcile the truth theory of litigation with the classification of
privileges as absolute. In the words of Professor Melanie Leslie, "In
a perfect [Wigmorean] world... the privilege would shield no
evidence. Privilege generates the communication that the privilege
protects. Eliminate the privilege, and the communication
disappears... . [T]he privilege would protect only.., statements
that would not otherwise have been made."
36
Wigmore believed that on balance there would be a "wash"
37
because in most instances, absent the privilege the evidence would
never have come into existence. 38 As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
33. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996).
34. See 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 504.03[4][a], at 504-10
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d 2004); 26A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH
W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5680, at 140-41
(1992) (noting that the policy for the privilege has given rise to the distinction
between fact and opinion, and courts have limited the deliberative process
privilege to opinions).
35. See 3 WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 504.0314][a],
at 504-10 to 504-11.
36. Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of
Privilege, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 31, 31 (2000).
37. See Pollard, supra note 15, at 999-1000 (noting that "exceptions to
privileges and concepts such as waivers diminish the costs of the privilege and
can provide access to the most important evidence").
38. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 215-16, 231 (1988).
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in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the justice system is in no
worse position because "the loss of evidence is more apparent than
real."3
Wigmore's assumption is a comforting one. It is certainly
reassuring to believe that we can safeguard sensitive relations such as
psychotherapy while simultaneously honoring a commitment to the
truth theory. The question, though, is whether the assumption is
valid. There have been a number of empirical studies of the
confidentiality expectations of attorneys' clients and therapists'
patients.40  On the one hand, the studies indicate that the lack of
absolute privilege protection would altogether deter a small minority
of persons from consulting and that a significant minority might
be guarded in their communications, especially written
communications. 41 On the other hand, the data falls short of
validating a generalization that absent the protection of a formal,
39. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998).
40. See I IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, at § 5.2.2 (discussing major
empirical studies of psychotherapist-patient and attorney-client 
privileges);
Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 321-22 (discussing psychotherapist-patient
and attorney-client studies); Edward Imwinkelried, The Rivalry Between 
Truth
and Privilege: The Weakness of the Supreme Court's Instrumental 
Reasoning
in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 49 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 
980 (1998)
(discussing the psychotherapist-patient studies); Richard 
C. Wydick, The
Attorney-Client Privilege: Does It Really Have Life Everlasting?, 
87 KY. L.J.
1165, 1173-74 (1999) (discussing "the shortage of empirical 
evidence about
whether the candor of communications would or would not 
be lessened if the
privilege were curtailed at the client's death); see generally 
J. Brad Reich, A
Call for Intellectual Honesty: A Response to the Uniform 
Mediation Act's
Privilege Against Disclosure, 2001 J. DiSP. RESOL. 
197, 213-15 (2001)
(discussing three surveys by Daniel Shumen and Myron 
Weiner); Jennifer
Evans Marsh, Empirical Support for the United States Supreme 
Court's
Protection of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 13 ETHICS 
& BEHAV. 385
(2003) (detailing a research project in which the 
subjects were given
hypothetical situations). In several situations, the subjects 
were informed that
since an exception to the privilege applied, there would 
be no privilege
protection; thus, at the time of the communication the subjects 
knew that no
privilege would later apply. Id. In the study, knowledge 
served as a
significant deterrent to disclosure; however, if the 
basic privilege were
qualified rather than absolute, at the time of the communication 
the subjects
would not already know that the privilege would be 
inapplicable. Id. The
study did not investigate the impact of reclassifying 
the privilege as qualified
rather than absolute. Id.
41. Imwinkelried, supra note 16, at 162.
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absolute evidentiary privilege, the average would-be client or patient
would not consult or confide.42 Thus, the findings of the empirical
studies most directly on point are at odds with Wigmore's
assumption.
However, those studies are few in number.43 There are fewer
than two handfuls of studies specifically addressing this important
evidentiary issue.44  Is there any other research or literature that
could shed light on the question?
45
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. In the past, legal scholars have, on occasion, turned to the psychological
literature to critique the behavioral assumptions underlying evidentiary
doctrines. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence: State of Mind in Issue, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 147, 150-57
(1929); Robert H. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the
Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675, 683-86 (1929)
[hereinafter Hutchins & Slesinger, Family Relations]; Robert M. Hutchins &
Donald Slesinger, Legal Psychology, 36 PSYCHOL. REV. 13, 15 (1929); Robert
M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence-Consciousness of Guilt, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1929); Robert M.
Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-
State of Mind to Prove an Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283, 291-98 (1929); Robert M.
Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-
Memory, 41 HARV. L. REV. 860, 863-73 (1928); Robert M. Hutchins &
Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-The
Competency of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017, 1021-28 (1928). However, the
subject of the assumptions underpinning privilege doctrine has been largely
overlooked. In their article in the Minnesota Law Review, Hutchins and
Slesinger do address the issue briefly. Hutchins & Slesinger, Family
Relations, supra note 45, at 679-82, 686. They point out that "practically no
one outside the legal profession knows anything about the rules regarding
privileged communications between spouses." Id. at 682. Furthermore,
"marital harmony among lawyers who know about privileged communications
is not vastly superior to that of other professional groups." Id. The authors
favor a qualified privilege and assert that the judge should be able to surmount
the privilege when the holder invokes the privilege to exclude "important" or
"crucial" evidence that "can be obtained no other way". Id. at 686. The
brevity of the authors' analysis is understandable. The authors wrote in the
late 1920s, and the intensive psychological study of self-disclosure did not
begin until the 1930s. See Raymond R. Reno & David A. Kenny, Effects of
Self-Consciousness and Social Anxiety on Self-Disclosure Among
Unacquainted Individuals: An Application of the Social Relations Model, 60 J.
PERSONALITY 79, 80 (1992).
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In fact, there is a considerable, 46 extensivea7 body of
psychological literature on the subject of communication in general,
and of self-disclosure in particular. Beginning in the 1930s, Lewin
began studying self-disclosure as a social psychological
phenomenon. 4 In the late 1950s, Sidney Jourard published a
celebrated article on the subject in Mental Hygiene.49 That article
spawned hundreds of studies investigating self-disclosure.5 ° There
has been a dramatic,51 virtually exponential 52 increase in the size of
the literature on this topic.
The purpose of this article is to survey that literature to identify
any insights into the validity of behavioral assumptions underlying
the current law of evidentiary privileges. More specifically, this
article addresses two questions. One is the validity of Wigmore's
generalization that without the protection of an absolute privilege,
the average layperson would not confer with or confide in confidants
such as therapists. Part one of this article surveys the psychological
literature relevant to the generalization. That generalization is at the
46. See Gordon J. Chelune, A Neuropsychological Perspective of
Interpersonal Communication, in SELF-DISCLOSURE: THEORY, RESEARCH,
AND THERAPY 9, 9 (Valerian J. Derlega & John H. Berg eds. 1987) (noting that
self-disclosure "has been extensively studied by social and clinical
psychologists interested in interpersonal communication and close
relationships").
47. See id.; Ken J. Rotenberg, Disclosure Processes: An Introduction, in
DISCLOSURE PROCESSES IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 1, 2 (Ken J.
Rotenberg ed., 1995) (noting that disclosure processes in adults have been
investigated extensively, but little is known about disclosure processes in
children and adolescents); Nancy L. Collins & Lynn Carol Miller, Self-
Disclosure and Liking: A Meta-Analytic Review, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 457,
457 (1994).
48. Reno & Kenny, supra note 45, at 80.
49. Charles H. Tardy, Self-Disclosure and Health: Revisiting Sidney
Jourard's Hypothesis, in BALANCING THE SECRETS OF PRIVATE DISCLOSURES
111, 111-12 (Sandra Petronio ed. 2000); see also SIDNEY M. JOURARD, SELF-
DISCLOSURE: THE TRANSPARENT SELF, at xi (1971) (acknowledging that
Chapter 3 of Transparent Self appeared in Mental Hygiene).
50. Tardy, supra note 49, at 112.
51. Susan S. Hendrick, Counseling and Self-Disclosure, in SELF-
DISCLOSURE: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND THERAPY, supra note 46, at 330.
52. Gordon J. Chelune, Preface to SELF-DISCLOSURE: ORIGINS, PATTERNS,
AND IMPLICATIONS OF OPENNESS IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, at x
(1979).
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heart of Wigmore's argument for classifying evidentiary privileges
as absolute rather than qualified. If the literature undermines that
assumption, there is a powerful case for treating privileges as
qualified and permitting judges to employ a balancing test to decide
whether to override the privilege in a given case.
If privileges should be reclassified as qualified, a second
question naturally arises. In deciding whether to surmount the
privilege, how much weight should the judge give to the layperson's
interests? More fundamentally, what are the layperson's interests? Is
the layperson interested only in obtaining the confidant's advice to
help the layperson resolve a legal or medical problem? Part two of
this article argues that in some circumstances, the layperson has
other-and often weightier-interests at stake. Especially when
such interests come into play, they cut in favor of upholding the
privilege and against ordering the disclosure of the privileged
information.
I. THE STRENGTH OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE FOR ABSOLUTE
PRIVILEGES: THE VALIDITY OF WIGMORE'S BEHAVIORAL
ASSUMPTION
At the outset, it is crucial to define the question. The question is
not whether the creation of absolute evidentiary privileges is a
sufficient incentive to encourage laypersons to disclose to confidants
such as therapists. Realistically, no incentive will suffice to
guarantee disclosure in all cases or perhaps even in the vast majority
of cases. 53 Rather, the issue is whether the recognition of absolute
privileges is a necessary incentive for the average layperson. It
seems plausible that absolute privileges could function in that
manner, but in scientific investigation it can be a grave mistake to
equate the plausible with the proven. What does the literature tell
us?
53. See Barry A. Farber, Patient Self-Disclosure: A Review of the Research,
59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 589, 591-92, 599 (2003) ("In one study... Weiner
and Shuman (1984) found that 42% of their sample had withheld information
from their therapists.... ." "Approximately two thirds of long-term
psychotherapy patients acknowledge leaving something unsaid during
sessions, and almost half admit having secrets .... Thus, it does appear that a
substantial proportion of therapy patients-perhaps about 50/--keep secrets
from their therapists .... ).
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A. Support for Wigmore's Generalization
Two lines of research documented in the literature strengthen
the case for the validity of Wigmore's generalization. One line
shows that assurances of confidentiality, such as privileges, result in
greater disclosure.54 The subjects in some studies rate a person's
willingness to keep secrets as one of the most important
characteristics of a desirable confidant.55 For example, assurances of
confidentiality appear to promote disclosure by battered women to
members of the staff of crisis centers. 56 Assurances serve "a...
facilitating function."
57
Even accepting this line of research at face value, however, it
falls short of validating Wigmore's generalization. Although the
proponents of Wigmore's view need not establish that absolute
privileges can function as a sufficient incentive for disclosure, they
must demonstrate that it is a necessary incentive for the average
layperson. Even if the person's realization of the existence of an
absolute privilege increases the level of self-disclosure from 40% to
50%, it is fallacious to leap to the conclusion that the recognition of
such privileges is an essential incentive. Simply stated, this line of
research does not prove up Wigmore's claim.
There is, however, another line of relevant research that
proponents of Wigmore's view can point to. This line of research
concerns the hypothesis that in deciding whether to disclose private
information, the layperson rationally balances the rewards and costs,
including the long-term risk that the disclosed information will be
used to the layperson's disadvantage. Perhaps the typical layperson
attaches such great weight to that long-term risk that without an
absolute privilege, he or she would be deterred from consulting.
As a general proposition, researchers have found that in making
54. See ANITA E. KELLY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SECRETS 182 (2002); Kevin
J. Corcoran, The Relationship of Interpersonal Trust to Self-Disclosure When
Confidentiality Is Assured, 122 J. PSYCHOL. 193, 193-94 (1988).
55. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 184.
56. See Lara E. Dieckmann, Private Secrets and Public Disclosures: The
Case of Battered Women, in BALANCING THE SECRETS OF PRIVATE
DISCLOSURES, supra note 49, at 275, 280.
57. William B. Stiles, Disclosure as a Speech Art: Is It Psychotherapeutic
to Disclose?, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH 71, 71 (James W.
Pennebaker ed. 1995).
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their decision, laypersons engage in a balancing process. 58 In effect,
the layperson practices privacy regulation.5 9  On the one hand,
laypeople consider the rewards, benefits,6' or utility62 of disclosure.
For example, they may factor into their decision whether the
disclosure will contribute instrumentally 63 to the accomplishment of
a goal. 64 They may weigh that benefit against the costs
65 or risks66
incident to disclosure. Moreover, to an extent, they may make a
forecast orprediction67 of the long-term reward/cost consequences of
disclosure. Those who do so will plausibly be deterred from
58. See SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS OF
DISCLOSURE 1-2 (2002); see also Sandra Petronio, Preface to BALANCING THE
SECRETS OF PRIVATE DISCLOSURES, supra note 49, at xiv (discussing that
"balancing may result in de-emphasizing openness"); Kathryn Greene,
Disclosure of Chronic Illness Varies by Topic and Target: The Role of Stigma
and Boundaries in Willingness to Disclose, in BALANCING THE SECRETS OF
PRIVATE DISCLOSURES, supra note 49, at 123, 134-35 ("People balance
positive and negative potential consequences of disclosure before being willing
to make decisions about illness.").
59. See VALERIAN J. DERLEGA ET AL., SELF-DISCLOSURE 65-67, 86
(1993).
60. See IRWIN ALTMAN & DALMAS A. TAYLOR, SOCIAL PENETRATION:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 6-7 (1973); Chelune,
supra note 52, at xii.
61. PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 26; Lawrence B. Rosenfeld, Overview of
the Ways Privacy, Secrecy, and Disclosure Are Balanced in Today's Society,
in BALANCING THE SECRETS OF PRIVATE DISCLOSURES, supra note 49, at 3,
10.
62. See Julia Omarzu, A Disclosure Decision Model: Determining How and
When Individuals Will Self-Disclose, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV.
174 (2000); David L. Vogel & Stephen R. Wester, To Seek Help or Not to Seek
Help: The Risks of Self-Disclosure, 50 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 351, 352
(2003).
63. See Chelune, supra note 52, at xii; ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 60,
at 161; see also David R. Shaffer et al., Gender and Self-Disclosure Revisited:
Personal and Contextual Variations in Self-Disclosure to Same-Sex
Acquaintances, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 307, 308 (1992).
64. See Valerian J. Derlega & Janusz Grzelak, Appropriateness of Self-
Disclosure, in SELF-DISCLOSURE: ORIGINS, PATTERNS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF
OPENNESS IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 52, at 151, 154.
65. See ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 60, at 6-7; Chelune, supra note 52,
at xii.
66. See PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 26; Rosenfeld, supra note 61, at 10;
Vogel & Wester, supra note 62, at 352.
67. See ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 60, at 7.
68. See id.; see also Dalmas A. Taylor, Motivational Bases, in SELF-
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disclosing by the risk that at a later point in time, a court will compel
the disclosure of the information revealed to the confidant.
Yet, even this body of literature does not validate Wigmore's
generalization. To begin with, the hypothesis assumes that the
layperson is acting rationally at the time of the decision whether to
disclose. Although the decision has a cognitive component, 69 the
nature of the event that triggers the necessity for consultation may
trigger emotions. Those emotions might overwhelm more rational
considerations. 70 Even if the layperson has a wholly rational frame
of mind and recognizes that disclosure carries with it long term risks,
the person may attach greater weight to the immediate demands of
the situation,7' such as the need to resolve a pressing legal or medical
problem then facing the person. The needs of the "here and now"
72
can be more influential in the person's decision making. 73 It may
well be rational for the person to assign greater weight to immediate
considerations. After all, the future considerations are often more
uncertain and speculative. 74 It would be rational for the person to
advert to the possibility of subsequent, judicially compelled
revelation of the disclosure. At the time when the person must
decide whether to disclose, however, the possibility of a later lawsuit
might be objectively remote.
Furthermore, the research demonstrates that it is simplistic to
assume the only competing considerations in a person's decision
making calculus 75 are the immediate instrumental benefit of
DISCLOSURE: ORIGINS, PATI'ERNS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF OPENNESS IN
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 52, at 110, 116 ("[E]valuation of
obtained rewards and costs.., leads to forecasts about future exchanges."
(emphasis omitted)).
69. See Leslie A. Baxter & Erin M. Sahlstein, Some Possible Directions for
Future Research, in BALANCING THE SECRETS OF PRIVATE DISCLOSURES,
supra note 49, at 289, 289-90.
70. See William B. Stiles, "I Have to Talk to Somebody": A Fever Model of
Disclosure, in SELF-DISCLOSURE: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND THERAPY, supra
note 46, at 257, 261.
71. See PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 1.
72. See ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 60, at 33, 39.
73. See Sarah Knox & Clara E. Hill, Therapist Self-Disclosure: Research-
Based Suggestions for Practitioners, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 529, 536
(2003).
74. See ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 60, at 44, 64.
75. See PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 3.
Winter 2004]
720 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:707
disclosure, contributing to the solution of the person's medical or
legal problem, and the long term risk that a court will later compel
revelation of the disclosure. In fact, people can and often do have
complex goal structures. 76 A person may have a diverse 
7 variety78
of conflicting, 79 contradictory8 goals. People might, for instance, be
quite concerned about how they present themselves to the
confidant. 81 They might be determined to manage the impression
that the confidant forms of them.82 In their minds, these other goals
may outweigh the considerations that privilege law has identified.
B Research at Odds with Wigmore 's Generalization
As we have seen, although some of the literature lends support
to Wigmore's position, even that literature falls short of validating
his generalization about the behavior of persons contemplating self-
disclosure. More importantly, other lines of research undermine the
validity of the generalization.
To begin with, numerous researchers have reported variations in
self-disclosure patterns from individual to individual.83  The
76. See Walid A. Afifi & Laura K. Guerrero, Motivations Underlying Topic
Avoidance in Close Relationships, in BALANCING THE SECRETS OF PRIVATE
DISCLOSURES, supra note 49, at 165, 169.
77. Id. at 174.
78. Lynn Carol Miller & Stephen J. Read, Why Am I Telling You This?
Self-Disclosure in a Goal-Based Model of Personality, in SELF-DISCLOSURE:
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND THERAPY, supra note 46, at 35, 38.
79. Id.
80. Afifi & Guerrero, supra note 76, at 168.
81. KELLY, supra note 54, at 129-34.
82. See Roxanne Parrott et al., Promoting Patients' Full and Honest
Disclosure During Conversations with Health Caregivers, in BALANCING THE
SECRETS OF PRIVATE DISCLOSURES, supra note 49, at 137, 137-38.
83. See SOCIAL PENETRATION, supra note 60, at 29; see also DERLEGA ET
AL., supra note 59, at 69-70; PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 83 ("[P]eople...
make up their own rules."); Corcoran, supra note 54, at 194 (citing differences
in disclosure levels between males and females under conditions of
confidentiality assurance in a nonclinical population); Paul C. Cozby, Self-
Disclosure: A Literature Review, 79 PSYCHOL. BULL. 73, 88 (1973)
(discussing the different clarifications researchers assign to those who disclose
and the variations between them); Farber, supra note 53, at 594 (discussing
disagreement amongst researchers regarding the effects of client gender on the
disclosure process); Maurice J. Levesque et al., Self-Disclosure Patterns
Among Well-Acquainted Individuals: Disclosers, Confidants and Unique
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variations are significant.84 Researchers who have explored the issue
have not found a correlation between willingness to disclose and
various personality traits.85  Instead, these researchers have
discovered large standard deviations 86 indicating a wide8
7 dispersion
of the values. 88 There is no single,
89 linear9 ° pattern or trajectory.
9 1
Rather, the patterns are complex92 and varied.9
Moreover, researchers have found that in many cases, a person
has a strong internal impulse to disclose and consequently does not
need an external incentive to do so. The literature includes numerous
examples of this impulse.94 It is sometimes called the fever model,95
or the expressive need hypothesis.96 A traumatic event generates
stress, and a feverish need to talk about the incident can be a
Relationships, 30 SoC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 579 (2002) (explaining that
the degree of self-disclosure is strongly influenced by individual differences);
Mario Mikulincer & Orna Nachshon, Attachment Styles and Patterns of Self-
Disclosure, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 321, 322 (1991) (discussing
the manifestations of individual variations).
84. See Farber, supra note 53, at 594; see also Lynn Carol Miller, Intimacy
and Liking: Mutual Influence and the Role of Unique Relationships, 59 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 50, 51 (1990) (noting the effect of underlying
interpersonal as well as intrapersonal dynamic processes and how therefore,
disclosure is unpredictable).
85. Reno & Kenny, supra note 45, at 80.
86. JOuRARD, supra note 49, at 11.
87. Jill Waterman, Family Patterns of Self-Disclosure, in SELF-
DISCLOSURE: ORIGINS, PATTERNS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF OPENNESS IN
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 52, at 225, 236.
88. 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 15-2(B) (2d ed. 1993).
89. DERLEGA AT AL., supra note 59, at 17.
90. See id.; ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 60, at 73, 135.
91. Judee K. Burgoon et al., Maintaining and Restoring Privacy Through
Communication in Different Types of Relationships, 6 J. SOC. & PERS.
RELATIONSHIPS 131, 132 (1989).
92. Irwin Altman et al., Dialectic Conceptions in Social Psychology: An
Application to Social Penetration and Privacy Regulation, 14 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 111 (1981).
93. See DERLEGA, ET AL., supra note 59, at 27.
94. See Bernard Rime, Mental Rumination, Social Sharing, and Recovery
From Emotional Exposure, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH, supra note
57, at 271.
95. See Stiles, supra note 57, at 71, 82; Stiles, supra note 70, at 257;
PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 58.
96. See PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 49.
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symptom of the distress. Thus, a high level of distress can cause
people to engage in self-disclosure. 97 They feel pressure98 or an
outright need 99 to disclose. The need can be compelling, 00
extreme,10 1 and insatiable. 10 2 In the vernacular, they feel a need to
"get it off' their "chest[s]" and "out in the open."'1 3 In effect, they
have no choice but to disclose. 10 4  The pressure to disclose is
especially acute when people experience an intensely emotional
episode. 10 5  In eight independent studies, after major emotional
episodes, between 90.0% and 96.3% of the subjects disclosed
information about the events.106 When people feel such an
overpowering internal need to divulge information about an event,
they will likely make the disclosure whether or not the law
recognizes an absolute evidentiary privilege cloaking the disclosure.
Of course, there will be many cases in which a person does not
experience such powerful psychological pressure to disclose. Even
then, however, there are factors other than the existence vel non of a
privilege that can determine whether the person decides to
disclose. 107 One notable factor is disclosure reciprocity. When two
people are speaking, the extent of one person's disclosure output
tends to match'0 8 or approximate'0 9 the disclosure input by the other
97. See Stiles, supra note 70, at 262; Vogel & Wester, supra note 62, at
353,358.
98. See Stiles, supra note 70, at 261.
99. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 21; Rime, supra note 94, at 271-72;
Robert E. Franken et al., Sensation Seeking and Disclosure to Close and
Casual Friends, 11 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 829, 832
(1990).
100. KELLY, supra note 54, at 21.
101. See PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 59.
102. Rime, supra note 94, at 271.
103. Stiles, supra note 70, at 263.
104. See Dieckmann, supra note 56, at 280 (acknowledging an interviewee's
admission that she had no choice but to make a disclosure).
105. Rime, supra note 94, at 271-72.
106. Id. at 274.
107. One factor is whether, on a personal level, the layperson likes the
proposed confidant. See Collins & Miller, supra note 47, at 466, 468.
108. See John H. Berg & Richard L. Archer, Responses to Self-Disclosure
and Interaction Goals, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 501-02 (1982)
(noting that "studies have found that recipients reveal information about
themselves that matches the intimacy of received information"); David R.
Shaffer et al., Self-Monitoring as a Determinant of Self-Disclosure Reciprocity
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speaker." It may be that one person's disclosure , rompts feelings
of responsiveness on the part of the other person. One person's
disclosure serves as a model for the other person,
1 2 and the latter
experiences a pressure to emulate"1
3 or imitate11 4 the former and
reciprocate.' '1 Or it may be that the former's disclosures
demonstrate commonalities between the two speakers, establishing a
basis for trust.
1 16
It is true that some have questioned the extent of the reciprocity
phenomenon. 117 Moreover, even those who subscribe to disclosure
reciprocity concede that there are limits to the phenomenon. In
particular, there appears to be consensus that as a relationship
advances, the degree of reciprocity decreases. 18 The vast majority
of researchers who have investigated the question, however, have
concluded that disclosure reciprocity is a strong norm. 119 There is a
large body of research,
120 documenting numerous experiments,
121
that verify the hypothesis. 22 The relation holds in many contexts; it
During the Acquaintance Process, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 163,
163 (1982).
109. See Shaffer et al., supra note 108, at 163.
110. Lynn Carol Miller & David A. Kenny, Reciprocity of Self-Disclosure at
the Individual and Dyadic Levels: A Social Relations Analysis, 50 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 713, 713 (1986).
111. PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 114.
112. See JOURARD, supra note 49, at 112; George Stricker, The Many Faces
of Self-Disclosure, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 623, 628 (2003).
113. Stricker, supra note 112, at 628.
114. Shaffer, et al., supra note 108, at 171.
115. See Myong Jin Won-Doomink, Self-Disclosure and Reciprocity in
Conversation: A Cross-National Study, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 97, 102 (1985).
116. See PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 215.
117. See id. at 50 (referring to Dindia's writings).
118. Id. at 51; see Paul C. Cozby, Self-Disclosure, Reciprocity and Liking,
35 SOCIOMETRY 151, 152 (1972); Teru L. Morton, Intimacy and Reciprocity of
Exchange: A Comparison of Spouses and Strangers, 36 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 72 (1978).
119. See Petronio, supra note 58, at 51.
120. Miller & Kenny, supra note 110, at 713.
121. See Susan Singer Hendrick, Self-Disclosure and Marital Satisfaction,
40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1150, 1150 (1981).
122. The research tends to show a curvilinear relationship. Id. at 1150;
Cozby, supra note 118, at 151, 155. The relationship is strongest when the
disclosure is moderate or medium. However, high levels of disclosure
sometimes do not prompt reciprocation at the same level. Persons who engage
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applies to adults and adolescents 123 as well as to strangers, mere
acquaintances, 124 and spouses.1
25
The existence of the disclosure reciprocity relationship is
considered to be the best established finding in the self-disclosure
literature.126 It is the most frequently cited, 12 7 the most commonly
discovered, 12 8 and the most consistent 129 finding in the self-
disclosure research. It is a powerful 130 and strong13 ' determinant 132
of a person's willingness to engage in self-disclosure. It is the best 133
and most reliable134 predictor of a person's willingness to disclose.
For that reason, it is a commonly employed strategy to encourage
self-disclosure. 135 Nevertheless, at one time therapists frowned on
self-disclosure. 136 The fear was that the therapist's revelation would
in very high levels of disclosure may be viewed as indiscreet and less well-
adjusted. Id. at 158. Their disclosures may pose a seeming threat to the other
person's privacy. Id. The other person often reacts negatively to
indiscriminate openness. See Tardy, supra note 49, at 120; Cozby, supra note
83, at 88 ("fear of a tyranny of openness"). The relationship can break down
for over-and-underdisclosers. Loneliness has been found to be inversely
related to willingness to self disclose, and lonely subjects either overdisclose or
underdisclose compared with their nonlonely counterparts in dyadic exchange.
Gordon J. Chelune et al., Loneliness, Self-Disclosure, and Interpersonal
Effectiveness, 27 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 462, 465-66 (1980).
123. Rotenberg, supra note 47, at 2-3.
124. Valerian J. Derlega & Alan L. Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in
Social Relationships, 33 J. Soc. ISSUES 102, 105-06 (1977).
125. See Hendrick, supra note 121, at 1150.
126. See Miller & Kenny, supra note 110, at 713.
127. Mikulincer & Nachshon, supra note 83, at 322.
128. See Alan L. Chaikin & Valerian J. Derlega, Liking for the Norm-
Breaker in Self-Disclosure, 42 J. PERSONALITY 117, 117 (1974).
129. Shaffer et al., supra note 108, at 163.
130. See Carl F. Johnson & James M. Dabbs, Jr., Self-Disclosure in Dyads
as a Function of Distance and the Subject-Experimenter Relationship, 39
SOCIOMETRY 257, 261-62 (1976).
131. See Cozby, supra note 118, at 151 (citing SIDNEY M. JOURARD, THE
TRANSPARENT SELF 179 (1964).
132. See Won-Doornink, supra note 115, at 97 (also noting that reciprocity
of exchange is not the sole determination of mutual exchange).
133. See Shaffer et al., supra note 108, at 163.
134. PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 50.
135. See Knox & Hill, supra note 73, at 531; Stricker, supra note 112, at
623.
136. See Knox & Hill, supra note 73 at 530; Stricker, supra note 112, at
624-25.
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undermine the appearance of objectivity and neutrality;' 37 ideally,
the therapist was supposed to be a "blank screen."' 38  However,
modernly, 139 therapists realize that self-disclosure can be a beneficial
intervention. 140  So long as the therapist avoids self-indulgence,
14 1
disclosure of his or her own difficulties 142 can make the therapist a
more authentic human presence for the patient. 143 The strategy is not
only confined to mental health therapists. Counselors also employ
it." Attorneys can also utilize it.145
In summary, rather than supporting Wigmore's generalization,
the research stresses the role of individual variation in persons'
willingness to self-disclose. In some cases, the individual feels such
strong internal pressure to disclose that there is no need to fashion an
absolute privilege to remove any potential disincentive for
137. PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 113.
138. See Knox & Hill, supra note 73, at 531; David B. Yourman, Trainee
Disclosure in Psychotherapy Supervision: The Impact of Shame, 59 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 601, 601 (2003); Stricker, supra note 112, at 625.
139. See Barry A. Farber, Self-Disclosure in Psychotherapy Practice and
Supervision: An Introduction, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 525, 526-27 (2003).
Professor Horn adds a caveat. In her experience, even today there are doubts
about the applicability of the reciprocity norm to clinical relationship. In her
words, "Even therapists who do disclose don't do it reciprocally." Interview
with Jacqueline Horn, Professor, Psychology Department, University of
California Davis (2004) (on file with author); see also JEREMY D. SAFRAN & J.
CHRISTOPHER MURAN, NEGOTIATING THE THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE 39-41
(2000) (describing the pitfalls of a clinician who does not practice reciprocity
disclosure); SHELDON J. KORCHIN, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY:
PRINCIPLES OF INTERVENTION IN THE CLINIC AND COMMUNITY 165-66 (1976)
(discussing how the clinical process lacks, to its detriment, "the normal
reciprocity of ordinary social encounters").
140. See Marvin R. Goldfried et al., Therapist Self-Disclosure in Cognitive-
Behavior Therapy, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 555, 555 (2003); Knox & Hill,
supra note 73, at 532.
141. See Stricker, supra note 112, at 627.
142. See, e.g., Robert Gaines, Therapist Self-Disclosure with Children,
Adolescents, and Their Parents, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 569, 569 (2003)
(stating that sharing of one's own adolescent social difficulties can help put an
anxious teenager at ease).
143. See Michael J. Mahoney, Emotionality and Health: Lessons from and
for Psychotherapy, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE & HEALTH, supra note 57, at
241,250; Knox & Hill, supra note 73, at 531-32.
144. See Dieckmann, supra note 56, at 280.
145. See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING,
COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING 265-73 (1990).
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disclosure. Admittedly, in other cases, the individual may need
encouragement to reveal. The literature does not clearly single out
evidentiary privileges as the most effective type of encouragement,
however. Rather, other factors, such as self-disclosure reciprocity,
can be more potent. If the question is whether the psychological
literature validates Wigmore's case for absolute evidentiary
privileges, the answer must be no.
II. IN A REGIME OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGES, How MUCH WEIGHT
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE LAYPERSON'S INTERESTS
COUNTERVAILING AGAINST DISCLOSURE?
Assume that the legislatures and courts come to reject
Wigmore's generalization. What impact would that rejection have
on privilege doctrine? On the one hand, that rejection would not
signal the end of all evidentiary privileges. On the other hand, it
would probably lead to the reclassification of most 146 privileges as
qualified or conditional. 147 In the past few decades, there has been
an incipient trend to treat privileges as qualified rather than
absolute. 148 In deciding whether to uphold a particular privilege
claim, trial judges would no longer be forbidden from employing a
case-specific balancing test.' 49  Rather, they could weigh the
opponent's interest in discovering the truth against the interests
served by the privilege. 150
Can the psychological literature provide the judge with any
guidance as to how to conduct the balancing analysis?
Understandably, the psychological literature has little to say about
the weight that the judge should attach to the opposing litigant's
interest in discovering and proving the privileged communications at
146. "However, given the national interest at stake, it is likely that the
[legislatures and] courts [would] continue to classify the privilege for military
and state secrets as absolute .... There is also a good possibility that to avoid
the unpleasant prospect of imprisoning clergy for contempt of court, the courts
and legislatures might decide to continue to accord clergy an absolute privilege
to refuse to disclose at least confessional disclosures." 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 8, § 5.4.4.a, at 420 n.138.
147. Id. § 5.4.4.a, at 420.
148. Id. § 5.4.4.b, at 426.
149. Id. § 5.4.4.a, at 423.
150. Id.
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trial. The law has more expertise in assessing that interest. The
literature has a good deal to say, however, about how to define the
holder's interests that can countervail in favor of sustaining the
privilege claim. When we think of the typical patient-therapist or
client-attorney consultation, we tend to identify the layperson's stake
as his or her interest in the resolution of the immediate medical or
legal problem prompting the consultation. Anyone familiar with the
psychological literature, however, would realize that the layperson
can have other, often weighty, interests at stake. In a significant
number of cases, the layperson's most important interest may be the
preservation of his or her long-term mental and physical health.
Wigmore's generalization may be flawed, but in some cases the
layperson will be reluctant to disclose absent a formal evidentiary
privilege. Especially when the incident precipitating the consultation
is a traumatic event that causes the layperson to experience troubling
emotions, the layperson's inability to disclose can have serious
implications for his or her health.
In an article in Mental Hygiene in the late 1950s, Jourard
advanced the hypothesis that an opportunity to self-disclose is vital
to achieving "healthy personality."' 51 Initially, Jourard's hypothesis
was dismissed as unsubstantiated. 52  Indeed, it was vilified as a
manifestation of an "ideology of intimacy."' 153  A consensus has
since emerged, however, that over the long term the inhibition of a
person's self-disclosure can lead to negative 154 mental and
physical 155 health consequences. Researchers in a variety of
151. See Tardy, supra note 49, at 111; see also Gordon J. Chelune,
Summary, Implications, and Future Perspectives, in SELF-DISCLOSURE:
ORIGINS, PATTERNS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF OPENNESS IN INTERPERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 52, at 243, 244, 253 (noting that Jourard developed
his notion of self-disclosure within the context of the healthy personality, and
his interest in self-disclosure grew out of his interest in healthy personality);
Derlega & Grzelak, supra note 64, at 152 ("[T]he humanistic view has been
that self-disclosure is a prerequisite for healthy personality functioning.").
152. Tardy, supra note 49, at 112.
153. Id. at 111.
154. PETRONIO,supra note 58, at 210.
155. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 56-57; see also James W. Pennebaker,
Preface to EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH, supra note 57, at xiii
(recognizing that disclosure can promote physical and mental health).
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disciplines 156 have amassed an overwhelming 157 body of evidence
indicating that inhibited persons 15  are more likely to suffer
psychological and physical sicknesses 159 and that, conversely, self-
disclosure can be therapeutic.' 60 In Freud's words, self-disclosure
can be a "talking cure."
'' 6 1
A. The Connection Between Inhibition and Impaired
Mental Health
A large number of vernacular expressions reflect the notion that
it can be healthy in a psychological sense to self-disclose. 162 The
concepts of "letting off steam" and "getting something off your
chest" are illustrative.' 63  Freud and Breuer came to the same
conclusion. 164 They believed that by enabling the patient to release
"pent-up emotions,"'165 disclosure could provide palliative relief to
patients and sometimes make a therapeutic solution possible.
166
Likewise, Harry Stack Sullivan, one of the leading American
psychiatrists of the 20th century, believed that inadequate
156. See James W. Pennebaker, Emotion, Disclosure, and Health: An
Overview, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH, supra note 57, at 3, 4
("researchers from several disciplines"); Tardy, supra note 49, at 112.
157. See Pennebaker, supra note 156, at 3.
158. See Christine Stephens, Health Benefits of the Disclosure of Emotions
About Traumatic Experiences: What Is the Evidence and Potential for
Therapeutic Benefits?, 2002-1 AUSTRALASIAN J. DISASTER & TRAUMA
STUDIES, available at http://www.massey.ac.nz/-trauma /issues/2002-
1/editial.htm.
159. Id.
160. Paul Corcoran, Therapeutic Self-Disclosure: The Talking Cure, in
DISCLOSURES, 118, 118 (Paul Corcoran & Vicki Spencer eds. 2002).
161. Paul Corcoran & Vicki Spencer, Introduction: Revealing Disclosure, in
DISCLOSURES, supra note 160, at 1, 14.
162. See Eugenia Georges, A Cultural and Historical Perspective on
Confession, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH, supra note 57, at 11, 15.
163. Id.
164. See Mahoney, supra note 143, at 241 (acknowledging that "there was
already an awareness that the theater of personal affective life was the
metaphorical fountain of all other modes of psychological experience"); see
also KELLY, supra note 54, at 85 (noting that Freud and Breuer found that "the
patient only gets free from the hysterical symptoms by reproducing the
pathogenic impressions that caused it and by giving utterances to them with an
expression of affect").
165. Corcoran, supra note 160, at 127.
166. Id.
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communication contributes to a wide array of mental disorders.
67
Jourard believed that self-disclosure is central to maintaining
psychological well-being. 68 Although the claimed linkage between
self-disclosure and psychological well-being is still a controversial
topic among psychologists, 169 many researchers have linked
inhibition and repression to such psychological disorders as
dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality disorder), bipolar
disorder, anorexia, and melancholia. 70
Various theories have been advanced to explain the linkage
between self-disclosure and psychological well-being. The
connection appears to be more complex 171 than simple catharsis 172 or
venting. 173  One theory is that a person's inability to engage in
appropriate self-disclosure heightens feelings of loneliness 174 and
isolation.' 75 Those feelings give the person's psychological life a
negative tone 176 and can make the person susceptible to more serious
mental problems. 177  Others theorize that when a person feels
compelled to withhold information from others, the person becomes
obsessed 178 or preoccupied 179 with the information. Thoughts about
167. See Mabel Blake Cohen, Introduction to 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, M.D., at xii (1953).
168. Collins & Miller, supra note 47, at 457.
169. Just as Professor Horn cautioned against generalizing that therapists
routinely employ self-disclosure, in a conversation with the author Professor
Goodman noted that many psychologists are skeptical of this claimed linkage.
Interview with Jacqueline Horn, supra note 139.
170. KELLY, supra note 54, at 104.
171. Mahoney, supra note 143, at 247.
172. See Anita E. Kelly et al., What Is It About Revealing Secrets That Is
Beneficial?, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 651, 652-53 (2001).
173. See James W. Pennebaker et al., Accelerating the Coping Process, 58 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 528, 536 (1990).
174. See Chelune et al., supra note 122, at 462.
175. Cecilia H. Solano et al., Loneliness and Patterns of Self-Disclosure, 43
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 524, 525 (1982).
176. See id.
177. Id.; Chelune, supra note 122, at 465-67; see KELLY, supra note 54, at
21 (stating that "lack of attachments has been linked to a variety of ill effects
on health, adjustment, and well-being").
178. See Daniel M. Wegner & Julie D. Lane, From Secrecy to
Psychopathology, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE & HEALTH, supra note 57, at 25,
26 (suggesting that thoughts, when kept secret, might become targets for
obsessive thinking and attention).
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that topic become intrusive, 180 contributing to a disordered thought
pattern and behavior. 181  The inhibition becomes a cumulative
stressor on the person's mental health.1
82
B. Physical Health
As previously stated, at one time there was skepticism of any
claimed connection between inhibition and health problems.
183
Although there were doubts about the connection between inhibition
and mental health, there was heightened skepticism of any supposed
nexus between inhibition and physical health. 184 Today, however,
there is a great deal 185 of empirical support 186 for the existence of
such a connection. James Pennebaker has conducted some of the
most important studies on this subject.'8 7  The evidence is so
strong 18 and impressive 189 that there is now widespread
acceptance' 90 of this hypothesis.
179. Id. at31.
180. See id. (cognitive processes involved with withholding of information is
comprised of these steps: (1) withholding causes thought suppression; (2)
suppression causes intrusive thought; (3) intrusive thought causes renewed
effort at thought suppression; and (4) steps two and three continue cyclically).
181. See id. at 43.
182. Dario Paez et al., Confrontation: Inhibition, Alexithymia, and Health, in
EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH, supra note 57, at 195, 206.
183. See Tardy, supra note 49, at 111-12 (noting that the contention put
forth by Jourard in Mental Hygiene, i.e., that self-disclosure facilitates
physiological health and well-being, appeared "so radical and unacceptable").
184. Id.
185. Id. at 121.
186. See Benjamin Dominguez et al., The Roles ofDisclosure and Emotional
Reversal in Clinical Practice, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE & HEALTH, supra
note 57, at 255, 258.
187. Tardy, supra note 49, at 113. See generally James W. Pennebaker,
Preface to EMOTION, DISCLOSURE & HEALTH, supra note 57, at iii, xiii
(addressing basic issues in psychology, including how people respond to
emotional trauma in their lives and why translating an event into language
affects physical and psychological health).
188. Keith J. Petrie et al., Repression, Disclosure, and Immune Function:
Recent Findings and Methodological Issues, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, &
HEALTH, supra note 57, at 223, 224; see Tardy, supra note 49, at 116.
189. See Pennebaker, supra note 156, at 6 (acknowledging "impressive data"
that links "inhibited emotional expressiveness in various parts of the body to
headache and back pain").
190. Tardy, supra note 49, at 116.
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The evidence indicates that the inhibition of a person's self-
disclosure can correlate with numerous,' 9 1 objective' 9 2 indices of
physical health. For example, there are empirical studies linking
inhibition to autonomic nervous system irregularities, 193 lower cancer
remission and survival rates, 194 elevated heart rate, 195 proneness to
coronary problems,' 96 cardiovascular illness, 97 exaggerated blood
pressure, 19 tension headache, 99 back pain,200 poorer natural kill
(NK) cell activity,201 higher serum anti-body titers in subjects with
202Epstein-Barr virus (EBV), greater susceptibility to infectious
illnesses,20 3 and increased negative response to viral vaccines.
204
Conversely, persons who engage in more extensive self-disclosure
tend to make fewer physician visits.
20 5
The nature of the causal relation between inhibition and
decreased physical health is not well understood.20 6 There are
plausible theories, however. One popular, plausible theory is that
inhibition is an active process, 20 7 requiring physiological effort20 8 to
191. Id. at 121.
192. Pennebaker et al., supra note 173, at 529.
193. Id.
194. Paez et al., supra note 182, at 206, 213.
195. KELLY, supra note 54, at 27-28.
196. Id. at 28.
197. Rosenfeld, supra note 61, at 13; Tardy, supra note 49, at 115.
198. Tardy, supra note 49, at 115-16; see also Pennebaker, supra note 156,
at 5 (noting that disclosure of emotional events brings about reductions in
blood pressure).
199. See Harald C. Traue, Inhibition and Muscle Tension in Myogenic Pain,
in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH, supra note 57, at 155, 158-61.
200. See id. at 163-68.
201. Petrie et al., supra note 188, at 225-27 (indicating that NK cell activity
is the most readily measurable element of immune function with relevance to
the control of tumors).
202. Id. at 225.
203. See id. at 224; KELLY, supra note 54, at 37.
204. See Petrie et al., supra note 188, at 228-29.
205. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 70-72, 79; see also Pennebaker, supra
note 156, at 4 (noting that "investigators have now found that writing about
traumatic experiences produces.., drops in physician visits"); Pennebaker et
al., supra note 173, at 535 (discussing the results of an experiment that
demonstrates that freshmen writing about their feelings regarding attending
college reduces the number of health center illness visits).
206. See Georges, supra note 162, at 12.
207. See DERLEGA ET AL., supra note 59, at 74; KELLY, supra note 54, at 4;
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suppress the information. 20 9  The expenditure of resources in the
effort210 to suppress information causes a visceral
211 or emotional 212
arousal.2 13 Over the long-term,2 14 the strain215 involved in this effort
impairs immunologic functioning.2 16  A compromised 2 17 immune
system2 18 reduces the person's resistance to disease 21 9 and renders
the person vulnerable to a wide variety of illnesses.
220
C. The Significance of the Connection in a Regime of Qualified
Evidentiary Privileges
Assume arguendo that a privilege claim is urged in a jurisdiction
that has abandoned Wigmore's insistence on absolutism and has
shifted to the view that communications privileges are qualified in
character. In this jurisdiction, even if the holder has not waived the
privilege and no special exception applies, the judge can override the
see also Gary E. Schwartz & John P. Kline, Repression, Emotional Disclosure,
and Health: Theoretical, Empirical, and Clinical Considerations, in EMOTION,
DISCLOSURE & HEALTH, supra note 57, at 177, 177-78 (describing repression
as an active, energy consuming process); Petrie et al., supra note 188, at 225
(describing inhibition of emotional expression as active).
208. Tardy, supra note 49, at 113.
209. Petrie et al., supra note 188, at 226.
210. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 98.
211. See Dominguez et al., supra note 186, at 256 (noting that visceral
arousal is necessary for emotional experience).
212. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 85 (noting that the venting of pent-up
emotions reduces the level of emotional arousal surrounding a troubling event
more often than not).
213. See id.; Dominguez et al., supra note 186, at 256; see also Stiles, supra
note 70, at 264 (noting the argument made by Pennebaker and his associates
that inhibition of disclosure following a traumatic event produces a chronic
physiological arousal that may ultimately result in physical symptoms).
214. See Traue, supra note 199, at 172; see also Rime, supra note 94, at 280
(discussing how subjects who had suffered from traumatic experiences were
more prone to later health problems if they did not share their experiences with
others).
215. See Traue, supra note 199, at 171 ("the effort and strain of suppressing
the emotional impulse").
216. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 31, 70, 79, 98; see also Pennebaker, supra
note 155, at xiii (discussing how emotional upheavals can disrupt many aspects
of life, including illness rates).
217. Petrie et al., supra note 188, at 226.
218. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 70-72.
219. See Tardy, supra note 49, at 113.
220. Pennebaker et al., supra note 173, at 529.
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privilege based on a case-specific balancing of a litigant's need for
the information against the policies supporting the privilege.
Furthermore, suppose that the facts 22 strongly suggest that, in the
instant case, during the consultation the layperson might not have
disclosed absent the assurance of confidentiality furnished by an
evidentiary privilege. For example, assume that the consultation
occurred after litigation was filed or at least expressly threatened.
Early in the consultation the layperson said little.222  When the
confidant asked about the reason for the layperson's evident
reticence, the layperson responded that she was worried that any
revelation would come back to haunt her at trial.223 The confidant
then explained the relevant evidentiary privilege. After the
explanation, the layperson finally made the revelation in question.
Later in the litigation, the opposing party seeks to discover the
content of the revelation. The layperson responds by asserting the
privilege. Although ex hypothesi the privilege is qualified and the
opposing party may have an acute need for the information, should
the judge necessarily deny the privilege claim? How much weight
should the judge give to the interests underlying the privilege? It is
submitted that when two additional circumstances occur, the judge
should assign great weight to the layperson's interest in upholding
the privilege.
One possible circumstance is that the event triggering the
consultation was traumatic, 4 or at least troubling, in nature. If the
221. The alleged holder of the privilege could disclose these facts in the trial
without waiving the privilege. A waiver occurs only when the holder reveals
the content or substance of the allegedly privileged communications. 2
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 6.12.4.a.(2), at 860. Hence, even a detailed
description of the circumstances surrounding the communication would not
effect a waiver of the privilege.
222. See Greene, supra note 58, at 126 (the person struggles with the
decision whether to disclose).
223. See id. In certain situations, it is quite plausible that the layperson
would make such a remark even without prompting by the confidant. For
example, the layperson might have been involved in earlier litigation.
Alternatively, in the current litigation there might have been earlier discovery
events such as deposition hearings which drove home to the layperson the
message that his or her pretrial revelations could conceivably be used as
evidence against him or her at a later trial.
224. See Stiles, supra note 70, at 261 (noting that a person's distress may
result from an isolated traumatic event).
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event that prompts the layperson to seek the confidant's help is
horrific 22 6 in character, the layperson may feel a high level of
stress. 22 7  Unless the layperson can relieve the distress228 by
disclosing to someone, such as the proposed confidant, the inhibition
may in the long term cause the type of mental and physical health
problems described above.
The second circumstance is that, as a practical matter, the
layperson has nowhere to turn other than to the confidant.229 The
research indicates that the preferred method of relieving the distress
is speaking with a live person rather than merely recording the
troubling information in a writing such as a diary.230 If the layperson
is unmarried, the person may have no close family member with
whom he or she has a privileged relationship.2 3 1 Even when the
layperson enjoys a privileged relationship with someone other than a
professional confidant, revelation in the course of that relationship
may not fill the layperson's needs. The quality of the
communication may be more important to the layperson's health
than the mere quantity of communication. 232 More specifically, a
social interaction may not suffice; 233 professional intervention2 34 may
225. See Corcoran, supra note 160, at 118 (discussing how the act of
confiding has long been considered an effective therapy for troubled minds).
See generally KELLY, supra note 54, at 118 (providing various types of
troubling secrets).
226. See PETRONIO, supra note 58, at 210 (discussing the application of the
communication privacy management theory in the study of children who have
been exposed to horrific experiences like child abuse).
227. Id. at 57.
228. See Vogel & Wester, supra note 62, at 353, 358.
229. If the person perceives that he or she lacks nonprofessional social
support, they are more likely to seek professional assistance. Id. at 355.
230. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 72-74.
231. Most jurisdictions do not recognize a privilege between parent and
child, or parent and siblings. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, at § 6.2.2.
Moreover, the jurisdictions recognizing a privilege for confidential spousal
communications do not extend the privilege to cohabitants who have not been
formally married. 1 Id. at § 6.9.1.a.(1).
232. See KELLY, supra note 54, at 119; see also Rime, supra note 94, at
283-87 (suggesting that the critical factor for recovery lies in the qualitative
aspects of social sharing).
233. See Rime, supra note 94, at 287 (noting that the "[n]atural social
situations are not likely to offer people opportunities to verbalize in depth and
at length").
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be necessary if an in depth23 5 exploration of the layperson's problem
necessitates expertise.
III. CONCLUSION
For the past decade, the doctrinal area of evidentiary privileges
has been one of my primary research interests. In the process of
researching that subject, I stumbled across the few studies, reported
in the legal literature, which explore the question of whether the
typical layperson is willing to consult and confide absent a formal
evidentiary privilege. 236 The discovery of those studies prompted me
to broaden my research to the psychological literature. The question
naturally arose: Does psychology have anything to tell the law about
the assumptions underlying privilege doctrine? Privilege law
obviously rests on a number of assumptions about human motivation
and behavioral assumptions that in principle, should not be accepted
a priori.
I discovered that there is an enormous body of psychological
literature and research on the topics of communication in general and
self-disclosure in particular. This Article merely scratches the
surface of the extensive psychological investigations of those topics.
Even after a cursory review of the psychological learning, however,
it is clear that the account of human motivation and behavior, upon
which privilege law rests, is incomplete.
To begin with, the law's account of the motivations of persons
contemplating disclosure is incomplete. For example, the law
assumes that in deciding whether to disclose to a professional
confidant, such as a therapist or attorney, the layperson focuses
primarily on: (1) the degree to which the consultation will contribute
to the immediate resolution of the problem that prompted the
layperson to consult the professional; and (2) the magnitude of the
risk that any disclosure will later be used adversely against the
layperson at a trial. Further, influenced mightily by Wigmore, the
law assumes that the typical layperson is so concerned about the
second factor that without the assurance of confidentiality furnished
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See sources cited supra note 45.
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by an absolute evidentiary privilege, the layperson would be
unwilling to consult or confide.
The psychological literature calls both of these assumptions into
question. That literature has revealed several factors other than the
two identified by privilege law that can significantly influence the
layperson's willingness to self-disclose. Psychology paints a far
more complex picture of the motivations of human beings
contemplating self-disclosure than the law posits. Moreover, as the
fever model of self-disclosure indicates, in a given case the layperson
may have such an overpowering need to disclose to the confidant
that there is no need to provide an absolute privilege to remove
disincentives to disclosure. Finally, the research has established such
marked individual variations in tendency to disclose that any
generalization about the decision making of the "typical" or
"average" layperson is suspect. In short, the psychological literature
appears to undermine the assumptions upon which the law has
historically relied to rationalize its insistence on absolute
communications privileges. It would be dishonest to claim that the
available data completely discredits the assumption. Most of the
studies in the literature do not involve cases in which the layperson
must decide whether to disclose or withhold highly incriminating
information about a crime.237 For that matter, however, the typical
consultation with a professional confidant does not fall within that
category of cases. At the very least, the literature does not validate
the law's traditional assumption.
In addition, the law's account of the interests of the layperson
contemplating disclosure is incomplete. The law tends to focus on
the layperson's instrumental interest in obtaining information and
advice to resolve the legal or medical problem that prompted the
consultation. At most, the law considers the instrumental interests of
similarly situated laypersons, as well as those of the particular
237. In a conversation with the author, Professor Goodman made the
common sense point that in an extreme case in which the layperson is deciding
whether to reveal information with profound criminal law implications, the
layperson may be reluctant to disclose absent the assurance of confidentiality
furnished by an evidentiary privilege. Interview with Gail S. Goodman,
Professor, Psychology Department, University of California Davis (2004) (on
file with author).
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layperson pressing the privilege claim upon which the judge must
rule.
The psychological research demonstrates that in many cases, the
layperson's stake includes far more than the instrumental benefit of
resolving the immediate medical or legal problem. In cases in which
the layperson is genuinely concerned about later disclosure, and in
which there is judicially compelled disclosure of his or her
revelations to a confidant, the inhibition of disclosure can not only
impair the layperson's ability to satisfactorily resolve the medical or
legal problem but, worse, may in some instances have serious, long-
term repercussions for the layperson's health. Especially when the
incident prompting the consultation was a troubling one and the
layperson has nowhere else to turn to release his or her distress,
inhibition can impair the layperson's mental and physical health. The
judge ruling on a privilege claim should not be blind to that
consideration. Rather, in an appropriate situation, the judge should
attach significant weight to that consideration as a factor cutting in
favor of upholding the privilege.
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